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Mandatory Adoption of IFRS and Analysts’ Forecasts  
Information Properties 
 
 
Abstract: This study examines the properties of the information contained in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for mandatory IFRS adopters in Europe for the period 2003-07.  We 
find a significant increase in the precision of both public and private information after 
switching to IFRS, especially for forecasts pertaining to 2006 and later.  However, we are 
unable to detect a change in the consensus among financial analysts after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS.  These results suggest that the higher percentage increase in the 
precision of common information is offset by a proportionate increase in the precision of 
private information such that consensus among analysts does not change.  When 
exploring analyst-specific precision in more detail, we find that the analysts who are 
following firms in more than one European country experience the largest post-IFRS 
improvement in private information precision.  These results hold after controlling for 
factors that are shown in prior research to be correlated with analysts’ information 
precision measures. Taken together, our results suggest that mandatory adoption of IFRS 
had a significant and positive effect on the information processing of financial analysts 
but this did not occur homogeneously across analysts. 
 
Key words: IFRS, mandatory IFRS adoption; analyst forecasts, information environment.  
JEL-codes: G15, M41, M48 
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Mandatory Adoption of IFRS and Analysts’ Forecasts 
Information Properties 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, more than 110 countries around the world adopted International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as their official accounting standards.  A large 
fraction of all firms that report under IFRS are domiciled in Europe.  In its Regulation 
No. 1606/2002, the European Commission identifies enhanced comparability and 
increased transparency as important objectives that should be reached via mandatory 
IFRS adoption for all listed firms starting from fiscal year 2005.  One way to study how 
the orchestration of such a large-scale, contemporaneous financial reporting switch 
contributes to these objectives is by studying the effect on financial analysts’ 
information.1  Mandatory adoption of IFRS can have a direct effect on not only the 
information that is common across all financial analysts but also on the information that 
is idiosyncratic (uniquely private) to individual analysts.  In other words, the precision of 
both common and idiosyncratic information can change after the adoption of IFRS.  In 
this study, we empirically evaluate whether and how the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
Europe altered the public and private information properties contained in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts.2 
                                                 
1 Prior research has identified financial analysts as an important set of expert information intermediaries. 
See Schipper (1991), Brown (1993), and Ramnath et al. (2008) for literature reviews describing the role of 
financial analysts in capital markets.  
 
2
 In this paper, we use the term IFRS to refer to all standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee or the committee’s successor, the International Accounting Standards Board, even 
though the standards issued by the former are typically referred to as International Accounting Standards 
(IAS).  Moreover, to vary the exposition in the paper, we refer to public information as common 
information and private information as idiosyncratic information.  
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Evidence on the effect of IFRS adoption on the information common to all 
analysts and the information idiosyncratically inferred by individual analysts is related to, 
but distinct from evidence on the properties of realized forecasts such as forecast 
accuracy.  Prior literature has primarily focused on the changes in forecast properties 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS and documented that forecast accuracy, analyst 
following, and analyst dispersion improve after the mandatory adoption of IFRS for a 
subset of firms from a subset of EU countries (Horton et al. 2009; Byard et al. 2010).  
However, forecast accuracy is a function of the precision of public and private 
information, both of which have been shown in prior research to be associated with cost 
of equity capital (Botosan et al. 2004).  To the extent mandatory IFRS adoption triggered 
private information acquisition, outcomes of forecast precision cannot provide 
unambiguous inference about changes in the information environment.  Tests on how 
mandatory IFRS adoption affected the precision of public and private information 
provide more direct evidence on the channels by which mandatory IFRS adoption affects 
analyst behavior and can help sort out the source of the effects of mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  
To measure quality of information, we use the information precision measures 
that were first developed by Barron et al. (1998; hereafter BKLS).  These measures are 
based on the assumption that analysts’ earnings forecasts reflect both public information 
shared by all analysts and private information available only to individual analysts.  We 
first measure separate empirical proxies for the precision of public and private 
information from the observed forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and 
number of analysts, and then use these estimates to derive a consensus measure to capture 
the proportion of the precision of analyst’s common information to the precision of their 
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total information.  We then use an interrupted time-series design to investigate the 
patterns in the information properties contained in analysts’ forecasts for the year 2005 
when IFRS was mandated in the European Union (EU) for listed enterprises and for the 
post-adoption years (2006-2007), all relative to pre-IFRS years (2003-2004).   
Using a sample of 1,364 mandatory IFRS adopters (4,530 firm-year observations) 
in 16 EU countries (i.e., the EU15 countries excluding Luxembourg, plus Norway and 
Switzerland) for the period 2003-2007, we find that mandatory adoption of IFRS 
triggered a significant increase in the precision of common information when forecasting 
2005 earnings, the first year of full-IFRS compliant reporting, as well as in the post-IFRS 
adoption period covering the years 2006 and 2007.  Moreover, we find an increase in the 
precision of private information, although the increase is only statistically significant at 
conventional levels in the post-IFRS adoption period.  These results hold after controlling 
for factors that are shown in prior research to be correlated with analysts’ information 
precision measures.  In addition, we show that post-IFRS improvements in precision are 
not driven by earnings management to “meet or beat” analysts’ expectations.  Overall, 
our results are consistent with the view that the precision of public and private 
information complemented each other after the first mandatory full-IFRS reports were 
published for EU firms.  
Despite the observed changes in the precision of public and private information, 
we are unable to detect a change in the consensus among financial analysts after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS.  This absence of a detectable change in the consensus 
among financial analysts suggests that the higher percentage increase in the precision of 
common information is offset by a proportionate increase in the precision of private 
information such that consensus among analysts does not change.  
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To rule out the possibility that our results may be driven by some time-varying 
factor, we replicate our results for a sample of U.S. firms that were not required to adopt 
IFRS during the 2003-2007 period.  Our sample of U.S. firms does not exhibit an 
increase in the precision of private or public information nor in consensus among analysts 
for 2005 or later earnings.  These out-of-sample benchmark results provide some 
confidence that our results for mandatory IFRS adopters in EU countries are not driven 
by a time-varying omitted variable.  To further substantiate that our results are due to 
mandatory IFRS adoption effects, we partition our sample based on the 2004 IFRS-local 
GAAP earnings per share reconciliation amounts.  Consistent with our expectations that 
information improvements are largest where IFRS affects firms’ reporting most, we 
document that IFRS adoption yields larger improvements in precision of public and 
private information for firms with larger reconciliation adjustments.  
Finally, we use the more generalized information measures developed by Gu 
(2005) to relax the assumption of equal precision of private information across all 
analysts in BKLS.  This feature of our study enables us to focus on the individual analysts 
as opposed to aggregate (i.e., consensus or average) measures of forecasts for all analysts 
following a particular company, and to control for the individual characteristics of 
analysts.  Consistent with the argument that IFRS enhances across country comparability, 
we find that especially analysts who follow firms from more than one country experience 
the largest post-IFRS improvement in private information precision. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the findings reported in this paper using the aggregated measures in 
BKLS (1998) are robust.   
Overall, our paper documents changes in analysts’ reporting environment 
following the mandatory switch to IFRS.  With this research, we contribute to two 
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streams of literature: the literature on the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption and 
the literature on analysts’ reactions to changes in disclosure.  Recent empirical research 
on mandatory IFRS adoption and analysts’ forecasts provides evidence that the 
information environment in the form of forecast accuracy and dispersion improved in the 
post-FRS period for a subset of firms from certain countries (e.g., Byard et al. 2010; 
Horton et al. 2009).  Our paper sheds light on how analysts use the information set under 
IFRS in forecasting earnings.  Specifically, our results indicate that mandatory adoption 
of IFRS not only increased the precision of information that is common across all 
analysts but also aided particular analysts’ abilities to develop idiosyncratic insights from 
public disclosure.  Moreover, our results highlight the importance of isolating the 
learning effects by distinguishing the time period when firms produced their first IFRS-
compliant information and later years following the first IFRS-compliant financial 
statements. 
Our study also contributes to research on regulatory reforms affecting analysts’ 
information environment. Prior studies are primarily based on US data and have, for 
example, examined the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) in 2000 
(Srinidhi et al. 2009), the Global Research Analyst Settlement of 2002 (Kadan et al. 
2009), and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Begley et al. 2009).3  The general tenor of 
these studies is that analysts experience only a temporary information quality increase 
following the reform, if any.  In the current study, we look at a significant accounting 
                                                 
3
 Both Reg FD and Global Research Analyst Settlement affected analysts’ activities directly: Reg FD 
eliminated all private or selective communication between firm management and preferred analysts, and the 
Global Settlement reform set out restrictions on analyst certification and activity type.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX), which aimed at improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure, primarily affected 
the (public) information set available to analysts.  Because SOX and Global Settlement were developed in 
unison and implemented in the same year, it is not feasible to isolate and examine the effects of just the 
financial reporting reform.  
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reform in a non-US context.  Our results are consistent with IFRS introducing a sustained 
improvement in the precision of both public and idiosyncratic information.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses prior 
research and derives testable prediction. In section 3, we address research design issues 
and sample selection. Section 4 reports summary statistics and empirical evidence. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2.  Related Literature and Testable Predictions 
2.1 Prior Research on the Association between Public and Private Information 
How financial disclosure affects investors’ public and private information has 
been the subject of extensive prior research.  In his analysis of how disclosure rules affect 
public and private information production decisions, Gonedes (1980) argues that the 
effectiveness of disclosure rules cannot be assessed independently of private information-
production activities if there exists a substitutive (or complementary) relationship among 
the signals produced on private account and those covered by disclosure rules.  
Consequently, empirical evidence dealing with the effects of new disclosure rules should 
reflect both the direct (public) effects of the rules on produced information and the 
indirect effects of any changes in private information production activities.   
There are two competing views that exist on the relation between public and 
private information. One view posits a substitutive relation between public and private 
information (Verrecchia 1982).  The argument here is that more publicly available 
information lessens the amount of costly private inquiry.  To the extent that more public 
information is available, it decreases not only the investor demand for analyst coverage 
but also the benefits for analysts in general.  An alternative view predicts a positive 
(complementary) relation between public and private information (Kim and Verrecchia 
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1994, 1997).  The argument here is that analysts primarily would interpret information in 
a way than complements public announcements (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Francis et al. 
2002).  Thus, public disclosure can reduce analysts’ forecasting costs and in turn increase 
the supply of forecasts.  In other words, more public information increases private 
information.  
In addition to the interaction that takes place between public and private 
information, analytical studies have also focused on the association between the precision 
of public and private information.  For example, Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) model 
suggest that an increase in the precision of public information leads to more precision in 
private information because more informed investors increase the precision of their 
private information to a greater extent than less informed investors.  Empirical evidence 
on this issue suggests a complementary effect.  Barron et al. (2002a) show that the 
precision of private information increases around earnings announcements and that the 
absolute increases in the precision of common information are larger than the increases in 
the precision of idiosyncratic information.  Byard and Shaw (2003) find that higher 
quality disclosures increase the precision of analysts’ common and idiosyncratic 
information.   In  a similar vein, Botosan and Stanford (2005) examine segment 
disclosures required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131 
and find that analysts responded to the change in their information environment by 
increasing their reliance on the public information that became available under SFAS No. 
131.  
2.2 Prior Research on Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
A number of studies have examined the capital-market effects of mandatory IFRS 
adoption in EU and other countries.  In their review of this stream of work, Hail et al. 
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(2009) conclude that that there is some evidence of positive capital market outcomes 
around IFRS adoption by firms around the globe.  The evidence from this line of 
research, while important, is indirect and limited because studies in this area focus on 
market aggregates without linking them directly to users of financial statement 
information. As a consequence, there is limited evidence on whether mandatory adoption 
of IFRS triggered significant idiosyncratic information.   
More recent research has begun to focus on a major set of users of accounting 
information, namely financial analysts.  Horton et al. (2009) examine how mandatory 
IFRS adoption in sixteen EU countries affected analysts forecast accuracy, following, 
disagreement, and volatility of revisions.  They find an improvement in the information 
environment only for non-financial firms that mandatorily adopted IFRS.  They also find 
the largest benefits for mandatory adopters in industries with high proportion of early 
voluntary adopters, revealing a learning curve during IFRS adoption.  
In contrast, Byard et al. (2010) find that relative to voluntary IFRS adopters, 
mandatory IFRS adopters in EU countries exhibit no significant change on average in 
analysts’ forecast errors, forecast dispersion, or analyst following.  However, they find 
significant decreases in both forecast errors and dispersion, and a weakly significant 
increase in analyst following for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both 
strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ substantially 
from IFRS.  They also find significant increases in the precision of both analysts’ public 
and private information for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both strong 
enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from 
IFRS.  In summary, the research conducted to date indicates that mandatory IFRS 
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adoption improved firms’ information environment for firms in particular industries and 
heterogeneously across EU countries.  
We extend this research in several respects by examining the impact of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on aspects of analysts’ information environments that remain unexplored 
in prior research.  First, to isolate any learning effects, we distinguish between the year 
when firms produced their first IFRS-compliant information, and later years following 
first IFRS-compliant financial statements.  Second, we do not use voluntary IFRS 
adopters as a control group because prior research (e.g., Hail et al. 2009) has questioned 
the use of this group as a control sample.  For example, competitive disclosure can cause 
these firms to disclose more when IFRS adoption becomes mandatory.  Moreover, the 
results could be attributable at least in part to innate firm characteristics that gave rise to 
the voluntary IFRS adoption decision in the first place.  Instead, we use firms from the 
U.S. as a benchmark sample. Third, we also focus on individual analysts as opposed to 
aggregate (i.e., consensus or average) measures for all analysts following a particular 
company. Finally, we test whether earnings management to meet or beat analyst 
expectations drive the findings of information environment improvements, if any, in the 
post-IFRS era. 
2.3 Testable Predictions 
Anecdotal evidence and reports by Big Four auditing firms on IFRS 
implementation (e.g., KPMG 2006; Ernst & Young 2007; PwC/IPSOS Mori 2007) 
indicate far greater disclosure and improved comparability across firms as a result of 
IFRS.  The first time mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU in 2005 led to a significant 
increase in disclosed information because firms not only explained transition effects due 
to the use of IFRS but also disclosed more footnotes about segments, pensions, share-
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based payments, and other transactions that were not required to be disclosed under local 
GAAP (e.g., Hall 2008; Hughes 2008).  This view is also reflected in the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s (2008) roadmap to mandatory IFRS adoption in the US, 
labeling IFRS as a high quality set of accounting standards. 
Several studies also show that IFRS are more comprehensive than most domestic 
standards (e.g., Bae et al. 2008) and that IFRS adoption tends to enhance financial 
reporting quality (e.g., Covrig et al. 2007; Barth et al. 2008).  As such, one could 
conceptualize the mandatory adoption of IFRS as a movement from a coarser to a finer 
information environment.
4
  The concepts of finer information environment and precision 
are inextricably linked in that a finer information environment is likely to result in a more 
precise public information signal.  To the extent that mandatory IFRS adoption indeed 
exhibits these characteristics, we formally state the first hypothesis as:   
 H1:  There is a significant increase in the precision of public information reflected 
in analyst forecasts following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
The precision of private information (or the information only available to an 
individual analyst) can come either from their private communication with managers or 
from individual analytical skills and effort (Gu 2005).  Mandatory IFRS adoption does 
not alter or limit the private communication with managers in the EU setting; analysts can 
still consult managers on accounting issues.  Anecdotal evidence (e.g., Citigate 2005) 
further documents that private communication in fact increased, especially in the first 
implementation year and that analysts were requiring additional, private information on 
certain IFRS numbers or transition effects.  Also, the variation across analysts regarding 
                                                 
4
 Some researchers (e.g. Ball 2006) note that because IFRS is principles-based, it allows the exercise of 
more management judgment and greater flexibility in its application.  In the context of our study, the 
implication is that weak country-level institutions can undermine the implementation of accounting 
standards, which in turn result in less credible financial reporting.  We test this implication in section 4.7 of 
our paper.    
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technical capacities is likely to persist and to become even more important under IFRS; 
the switch to IFRS requires analysts to get familiar with new accounting rules and 
information, and get additional training.  This suggests that analysts can still differentiate 
themselves from others, even more so than pre-IFRS.  Moreover, the analytical model 
developed by Indjejikian (1991) suggests that when individual investors are equally 
informed and risk tolerant, the disutility from all investors becoming equally more 
informed by increased public disclosure increases investor demand for idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the disclosure.  In the context of our study, mandatory adoption of IFRS 
is expected to increase the effort put in by analysts on their own idiosyncratic information 
gathering and analysis.  In other words, mandatory adoption of IFRS is likely to increase 
the precision of private information.  Formally stated, the second hypothesis is:   
H2:  There is a significant increase in the precision of private information 
reflected in analyst forecasts following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
To the extent that private and public information sets vary in precision, two 
outcomes are possible.  If the public information set increases more in precision than the 
private information set, then analysts’ forecast consensus is likely to increase post-IFRS.  
Alternatively, if the public information set increases less in precision than the private 
information set, then analysts’ forecast consensus is likely to decrease post-IFRS.  The 
directional effect on consensus, however, remains an empirical issue. This results in our 
third hypothesis, which is formally stated as:   
H3:  There is a change in analysts’ forecast consensus following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. 
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3. Sample and Research Design   
3.1 Sample 
Our initial sample consists of all firms that (1) were domiciled in one of the 16 
EU countries (EU15 countries minus Luxembourg, plus Norway and Switzerland) which 
required by law the switch to IFRS for listed firms as of fiscal year 2005, (2) have 
December 31 fiscal year-ends
5
, (3) have annual EPS data available from the I/B/E/S 
actual earnings announcement file, and (4) have at least two non-stale one-year ahead 
analyst EPS forecast (FPE1) on the I/B/E/S database.
6
  We select forecasts of one-year 
ahead annual earnings made within three months after the prior year’s annual earnings 
announcement by analysts who also forecasted and/or updated one-year ahead annual 
earnings within six months prior to the current year’s earnings announcement date for 
that same firm (i.e., are non-stale by nature).  Selection of these forecasts ensures that 
forecasts are conditioned on the same publicly disclosed information set.  The choice of 
relatively ‘early’ forecasts is especially warranted in a mandatory IFRS setting because 
prior research by Christensen et al. (2009) documents cross-sectional variation in the 
timing of information dissemination during the IFRS transition years, which has the 
potential for affecting the variance in public information of later forecasts from that of 
interim, IFRS-related news.7  We select the forecast closest to prior year’s earnings 
                                                 
5
 We limit our analysis to firms with December fiscal year-end to facilitate cross-sectional comparison. 
 
6 The requirement that earnings forecasts are available from at least two analysts for each earnings 
announcement is necessary for computing forecast dispersion measures.   
 
7
 Note, however, that our results remain unaffected when we select forecasts from 3, 4 or 6 months before 
the current year’s earnings announcement (results available upon request).  We also applied various 
sensitivity checks to the selection of staleness periods: 6 months before and 6 months after the earnings 
announcement date; 3 months before and 3 months after the earnings announcement date; and 4 months 
before and 4 months after the earnings announcement date.  All results remain qualitatively unchanged for 
these alternative definitions of staleness periods.  
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announcement date in cases where more than one forecast is available from the same 
individual analyst.  
Because the focus of this study is on the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption, we 
delete firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 2005 or adopted IFRS only after 2007 
(such as AIM firms on the London Stock Exchange).
8
  We also require availability of 
sufficient data on Datastream to compute the financial data items and stock market data 
used in the empirical tests.  This screening process results in 9,856 analyst-year and 4,530 
firm-year observations (1,364 unique firms).
9
  To benchmark the results for the EU firms, 
we also identify a U.S. sample of 11,710 analyst-year and 9,976 firm-year observations 
(3,158 unique firms).  Panel A and B of Table 1 summarize the sample selection 
procedures for EU and U.S. firms, respectively.    
[Insert Table 1] 
3.2 Research Design  
We use an interrupted time-series design to investigate the patterns in the 
properties of the information contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  Information 
properties are based on analysts’ earnings forecasts issued in the 3 months immediately 
after prior year’s earnings announcement.  For example, the information metrics for 2005 
are measured using analyst earnings forecasts issued during the 3 months after the 2004 
                                                 
8
 In unreported analyses we include additional requirements with respect to the minimum number of years 
that an analyst following a firm should be represented in the sample.  Requiring at least 4 years (out of 5) of 
observations per firm reduces the sample size (firm-years) to 669 firms (3,163 firm-years) but does not 
affect the conclusions of our analyses. 
 
9
 Sample composition by country (in alphabetical order) is as follows: Austria (31), Belgium (153), 
Denmark (139), Finland (306), France (629), Germany (327), Greece (124), Ireland (46), Italy (381), the 
Netherlands (355), Norway (265), Portugal (53), Spain (300), Sweden (444), Switzerland (130), and the 
UK (847). Industries are fairly well represented in the final sample.  Largest number of observations (about 
22.3 percent) belong to SIC code 3 (Manufacturing).  The least number of observations (about 4.7 percent) 
are from SIC code 8 (Services other than Entertainment, Food and Accommodation).  
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fiscal-year earnings announcement.  Forecasts that relate to earnings of fiscal year 2005 
(ADOPT), the year when IFRS was mandated in EU for listed enterprises, are compared 
to earnings forecasts for the Pre-IFRS adoption period (2003, 2004).  Similarly, earnings 
forecasts for 2006 and 2007 (POSTADOPT), the years reflecting the Post-IFRS adoption 
period, are compared to earnings forecasts for the Pre-IFRS adoption period (2003, 
2004).
10
  For our multivariate analyses, we use the following model to test properties of 
analysts’ information environment around mandatory IFRS adoption:  
INFi,t =  α0 + β1ADOPTi + β2POSTADOPTi + β3Log(MV) i,t + β4 MTBi,t + β5RDi,t  
          
 + β6NUMANALi,t + β7AVG_PREDLAG i,t + β7PROP_LATEi,t  
 
 + γj ∑INDj + θc ∑CNTRYc + εi,t                                                               (1)                                                                  
where:  
INF =  properties of the information contained in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for firm i and fiscal year t  
 
ADOPT       =         dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation is from 
fiscal year 2005 (mandatory IFRS adoption year) and 0 
otherwise 
 
POSTADOPT =  dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation is from 
2006 or 2007 fiscal year (post-mandatory IFRS adoption 
years) and 0 otherwise  
 
MV = the market value of equity of the firm at fiscal year-end 
[Source: Datastream] 
 
MTB =  market-to-book ratio at fiscal year-end [Source: 
Datastream] 
 
RD =  average research & development expense in the post-IFRS 
(2006 and 2007) period [Source: Datastream]
11
 
                                                 
10
 We separate the IFRS transition year (2005) from later years (2006 and 2007) to enable us to isolate the 
‘learning’ effects associated with the new reporting standards. This learning effect would predict a more 
pronounced improvement in information properties in the period after the first full-IFRS compliant reports, 
i.e., for metrics labeled as 2006 and later. 
11 We average the research and development expenditures over the post-IFRS period because Nobes (2001) 
reports different accounting rules for capitalization of R&D in EU countries in the pre-IFRS time-period.  
However, our inferences are not sensitive to the measurement of this variable.   
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NUMANAL  =  the number of unique analysts that issue at least one EPS 
forecast during the 3-month period following prior year’s 
earnings announcement [Source: I/B/E/S] 
 
AVG_PREDLAG=       average number of days between previous year’s earnings 
announcement and an analyst’s initial EPS forecast that 
was initiated within 3 months after prior year’s earnings 
announcement [Source: I/B/E/S] 
 
PROP_LATE =       number of one-year ahead EPS forecasts not initiated 
within 3 months after prior year’s earnings announcement 
expressed as a fraction of all one-year ahead EPS forecasts 
issued during the fiscal year [Source: I/B/E/S] 
 
IND = Industry-fixed effects (based on one-digit SIC codes) 
 
CTRY = Country-fixed effects 
 
For the test of our hypotheses H1 to H3, we focus on three properties of the 
information contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts: precision of public information; 
precision of private information; and analysts’ forecast consensus.  Specifically, we use 
model (1) to regress these information properties on the test variables ADOPT (2005 
dummy) and POST_ADOPT (2006-07 dummy) and a set of control variables including 
firm characteristics, and industry and country fixed effects.  All variables in model (1) are 
discussed in more detail below.   
In the absence of a theoretical basis for predicting whether the relation between 
our dependent variables and independent variables is linear, we follow Barron et al. 
(2002b) and transform the dependent and independent variables into standardized rank 
(0,1) variables and use them in estimating model (1) as an ordinary least squares 
regression.
12
   
                                                 
12
 Results based on alternative regression specifications where we include log transformations of the 
standardized ranked values – where the log transformation of each dependent variable X equals 
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3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
To measure the properties of analysts’ information environment, we follow prior 
studies by Barron et al. (2002a; 2002b) who use the methods initially developed by 
BKLS to derive empirical proxies.  BKLS build a model to derive the unobservable 
properties of the information environment from the observable properties of analyst 
forecasts.  In this model, each analyst observes two signals about future earnings u: a 
common prior shared by all analysts that u is normally distributed with mean ū and 
precision (inverse of variance) h; a private signal za = u + ea available only to analyst a, 
where ea is normally distributed with mean zero and precision sa, and independent of all 
other information.  Analyst a will make a forecast of future earnings based on her 
expectation and conditional on her two signals, Fa = (hū+saza)/(h+sa).  Variance of her 
forecast error is Va = 1/(h+sa). Assuming multiple forecasts, BKLS further show that 
under the assumption of identical sa’s across all analysts (= s), h and s can be computed as 
a function of the observable, ex-post realized dispersion and error in mean forecast, 
namely as:
13
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13
 In order to calculate dispersion and mean forecasts, we required at least two analysts forecasting each 
earnings number. The requirement of identical sa’s across analysts is relaxed in section 4.6 following Gu 
(2005).  
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where D represents the dispersion among the forecasts of a firm and is equal to 
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SE is the squared error in the mean forecast of a firm and is equal to 
( ) ,2FA − Fa is the forecast by analyst a, F  is the mean forecast, A is the actual earnings 
realization, and N is the number of analysts issuing forecasts. Both D and SE are scaled 
by absolute actual earnings A.14  Using actual forecasts and earnings to estimate the 
unobservable precision properties however implies that SE – D/N can be smaller than 0, 
resulting in negative precision of common information.  Following prior studies (Barron 
et al. 2002a; Begley et al. 2009), we restrict h to be positive by including only SE in the 
numerator in those cases.
15
  
We also compute the BKLS correlation measure (ρ) which is a measure of the 
across analyst correlation in forecast errors.  Specifically, this correlation represents the 
degree of consensus among analysts and captures the ratio of the precision of analysts’ 
common information to the precision of their total information. That is ρ = h/(h+s). 
Empirically, the BKLS consensus measure can be computed using the same observable 
features of analysts’ forecasts, as follows: 
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14
 Using unscaled D and SE, or scaling by stock price at fiscal year-end, yields consistent results. 
15
 In a sensitivity test, we delete these observations and obtain similar results. 
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To ensure comparability of our study with prior studies on mandatory IFRS 
adoption and analyst information properties, we also use dispersion and the squared error 
in the mean forecast (SE) as dependent variables in model (1).   
3.2.2 Test Variables 
The use of IFRS was made mandatory for all fiscal years commencing on or after 
January 1, 2005 for all listed firms in the European Union (Deloitte 2005).
16
  In the 
regression model (1) we introduce two indicator variables, ADOPT and POSTADOPT.  
ADOPT refers to fiscal year 2005 or the year in which all listed-firms in Europe were 
required to adopt IFRS; POSTADOPT refers to the years after 2005.  Both variables are 
introduced as main effect variables to capture information effects of mandatory IFRS 
adoption relative to the pre-period covering fiscal years 2003 and 2004.  
3.2.3 Control Variables   
Following prior research, model (1) includes several control variables previously 
shown to be related to the properties of analysts’ information (e.g., Barron et al 2002b).  
We include market value of equity (MV) to control for a firm’s size and its associated 
effects on the properties of analysts’ information.  King et al. (1990) argue that 
information acquisition is less costly for large firms, which increases the incentives of 
investors and financial analysts to acquire private information for these firms.  Prior 
empirical research has shown a positive relation between firm size and the quantity of 
information available to investors.  
We also include market-to-book ratio (MTB) as a control for variations in a firm’s 
growth opportunities.  Prior research (e.g., Bhushan 1989) has shown that growth firms 
                                                 
16 There are exceptions to this rule in that firms listed on less regulated markets (for instance the Alternative Investment 
Market [AIM] in London) or firms reporting non-consolidated reports have the option to postpone the first IFRS year to 
fiscal year 2007.   
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tend to have higher analyst following, suggesting greater demand for private information 
for high-growth firms.  Barron et al. (2002b) show that analyst consensus is negatively 
related to the degree to which a firm is comprised of intangibles, indicating that forecasts 
of earnings for high intangible firms contain a high proportion of private information.  
Given that research and development expenditures represent internally generated 
intangibles, we include the natural log of research and development expenditures (RD) as 
an additional control variable.  
To control for any differences in BKLS measures arising from the number of non-
stale forecasts used for estimation purposes, we include three additional control 
variables.17 NUMANAL is the number of unique analysts that issue at least one forecast 
during the 3-month period following prior year’s earnings announcement. 
AVG_PREDLAG is the average number of days between prior year’s earnings 
announcement and an analyst’s initial EPS forecast that was initiated within 3 months 
after previous year’s earnings announcement. Finally, PROP_LATE are the one-year 
ahead EPS forecasts that are not initiated within the 3 month period after prior year’s 
earnings announcement, expressed as a fraction of all one-year ahead EPS forecasts 
issued during the calendar year. We include industry fixed effects (IND) based on one-
digit SIC codes to control for any relation between informational properties and the 
industry to which a firm belongs.  Moreover, we include country-fixed effects (CNTRY) 
to control for the impact of cross-country difference in explaining our information 
environment variables. 
                                                 
17 The staleness period starts from 90 days (3 months) after the previous year’s earnings announcement 
date. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides univariate analyses of analysts’ information environment 
properties for the whole EU market to highlight their evolution over three distinct time 
periods.  Period 1 refers to forecasts on fiscal years 2003 and 2004 when IFRS adoption 
was not mandatory.  Period 2 covers forecasts for the fiscal year 2005 when mandatory 
IFRS adoption became effective and firms produced their first IFRS-compliant 
information; and period 3 refers to forecasts on the fiscal years following first IFRS-
compliant financial statements (i.e., 2006 and 2007).   
[Insert Table 2] 
 The precision of both common (h) and idiosyncratic (s) information exhibit an 
increase over time.  For the whole EU market, the median level of h starts out at 4.88 in 
pre-IFRS time period (period 1), increases to 6.61 for the 2005 year-end forecasts (period 
2), and 11.94 in post-IFRS adoption time period (period 3).  The median level of s 
increases from 2.09 in period 1 to 2.89 in period 2 and then to 5.77 in period 3.  
Unreported test statistics show a statistically significant increase in h and s over time.  On 
a univariate basis, these results suggest that the precision of both common and 
idiosyncratic information increases around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and is most 
pronounced for the later full-IFRS compliant years (i.e., fiscal years 2006 and 2007). 
In contrast, the BKLS correlation measure (ρ), which captures the across-analyst 
correlation in forecast errors, declines over time.  Recall that the theoretical value of ρ 
ranges between zero and one, where zero indicates that the information contained in 
individual forecasts is entirely idiosyncratic, and one indicates that all forecasts are the 
same.  The median level of ρ is 0.74 in period 1, increases to 0.75 in period 2, and then 
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reduces to 0.72 in period 3.  However, unreported test statistics indicate that the 
magnitude of the decline is not statistically significant.  Moreover, dispersion and squared 
error in mean forecast, the two measures used in deriving the information properties, 
exhibit a decline over time.  That is, forecasts become more accurate under IFRS and 
there are smaller forecast differences among analysts. 
Panel A and B of Table 3 contain the summary statistics for selected firm-level 
variables used in our regression models for the EU and US sample, respectively.  The 
median firm in our EU sample has a market value of equity of 970 million Euros and has 
a market-to-book ratio of 2.23.  Fewer than fifty percent of the firm-year observations 
incur research and development expenditures.  Further, for the median firm in our sample 
there are five one-year-ahead EPS forecasts made by unique analysts within three months 
after the previous year’s earnings announcement.  For these early forecasts (i.e., made 
within 3 months), the average number of days between previous year’s earnings 
announcement and the new one-year ahead forecast is 30 days.  Moreover, for the median 
firm, about 55 percent of all one-year ahead forecasts are made after this 3 month 
estimation period (i.e., are late forecasts).  On average, the US firms in our sample are 
larger in size than the EU firms.  For these US firms, analysts also take less time to issue 
a new one-year ahead forecast after a prior years’ earnings announcement and analysts 
issue less late one-year ahead forecasts.  
[Insert Table 3] 
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4.2 Correlations  
Table 4 reports Spearman correlation of variables used in our regressions for the 
EU sample.18  The precision of analysts’ common information (h) is positively correlated 
(0.54) with the precision of analysts’ idiosyncratic information (s).  Consistent with its 
definition, the BKLS measure of consensus (ρ=h/(h+s)) is positively correlated with the 
precision of common information (0.10) and negatively with the precision of private 
information (-0.73).  Moreover, precision of common and idiosyncratic information 
exhibit high correlations with dispersion (D; -0.77 and -0.28 respectively) and squared 
error in analysts’ mean forecast (SE; -0.57 and -0.92 respectively).  Finally, the high 
correlations between the information metrics and many of the control variables suggest 
that it is important to control for these factors in assessing the effects of IFRS adoption on 
these metrics.  To examine whether the correlations among control variables are 
problematic in regression estimations, we diagnose multicollinearity in the regressions 
using variance inflation factors (VIFs).  Overall, these VIFs are low, suggesting that 
collinearity is unlikely to be a significant issue in interpreting the regression results.   
[Insert Table 4] 
4.3 Regression Results 
Panel A of Table 5 reports regression results for model (1) using five dependent 
variables: precision of common information (h), precision of idiosyncratic information 
(s), across-analyst correlation (consensus) in forecast errors (ρ), dispersion (D), and mean 
squared error in analysts’ forecasts (SE).  We include industry fixed effects (one-digit 
SIC codes) and country fixed effects but do not report coefficients for brevity reasons.  
                                                 
18 For brevity, we do not tabulate the spearman correlations for the U.S. sample.  Pair-wise correlations for the US 
sample exhibit patterns similar to those for the EU sample.  
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The tests of significance reported in Table 5 are based on robust t-statistics that are 
clustered at the firm level (Petersen 2009).  The explanatory power of model (1) for the 
five dependent variables ranges between 0.064 and 0.194.  
[Insert Table 5] 
For each of the dependent variables, the coefficients on the main effects of 
ADOPT and POSTADOPT are of interest.  In the column labeled (1) where the precision 
of common information (h) is the dependent variable, the coefficient on ADOPT (0.022; 
p<0.05) indicates that precision of common information increased in the year of IFRS 
adoption.  The coefficient on POSTADOPT in column (1) equals 0.105 (p<0.01), which 
suggests that the precision of common information in the POSTADOPT period (i.e., after 
2005) substantially increased, after controlling for all other factors affecting precision of 
common information.  Taken together, these results suggest that precision of common 
information increased from the moment of, and especially after the first year of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
The results in column (2) indicate that the precision of idiosyncratic information 
(s) does not change for forecasts relating to the first year of mandatory adoption.  
However, the precision of idiosyncratic information (s) increased in the years after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS (0.085; p<0.01). 19  These results suggest that the precision 
of idiosyncratic information especially improved once firms are fully-compliant with 
IFRS reporting.  The fact that both private and common information precision increased 
from fiscal year 2006 onwards supports the view that common and private information 
                                                 
19
 As an alternative specification, when we include the precision of public information (h) as a control 
variable, adjusted-R
2
 of the model in column (2) increases from 0.138 to 0.188.   Moreover,, the coefficient 
on h is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, while the inferences with respect to the 
variables, ADOPT and POSTADOPT, remain the same.    
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serve as complements to each other.  That is, better public information increases the 
quality of private information. 
When ρ is the dependent variable in column (3), neither the coefficient on 
ADOPT nor the coefficient on POSTADOPT are statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
These results indicate that the percentage of the common information impounded in the 
mean forecast did not change in the year of IFRS adoption and thereafter.  In other words, 
the increase in the precision of common information is offset by the increase in the 
precision of idiosyncratic information, such that the consensus among analysts remains 
unaffected.   
When dispersion (D) or squared error in the mean forecast (SE) are used as  
dependent variables in columns (4) and (5), respectively, the coefficients on ADOPT and 
POSTADOPT are negative and statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level, 
indicating that dispersion and squared mean error in the first year of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS and thereafter decreased.  These results for dispersion and squared error 
in the mean forecast are consistent with those reported in prior IFRS research (e.g. 
Horton et al. 2009), which adds confidence that our sample is representative of what has 
been used in prior research to examine the effects of mandated IFRS adoption on the 
properties of realized forecasts.   
  As a sensitivity analysis, we also compare information environment proxies over 
time for a benchmark sample of US firms.  The models in Panel B of Table 5 are identical 
to those used in Panel A, but use data from the US.
 
  Unlike the mandatory IFRS firms, 
U.S. firms do not experience an increase in precision of private and public information in 
2005 or later years.  In fact, the coefficients on ADOPT and POSTADOPT are negative 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level when precision of common information (h) is 
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used as the dependent variable, suggesting that the precision of common information 
even reduced for U.S firms over the corresponding time period.  Moreover, the consensus 
across analysts went down in the POSTADOPT period, while both dispersion and 
squared error in the mean forecast increased in the POSTADOPT period.  Overall, the 
evidence from the benchmark U.S. sample provides confidence that our results for 
mandatory IFRS adopters are not driven by a time-varying omitted variable. 
4.4 Subsample Analysis of Information Measures   
In this section, we relate the change in the precision of common and private 
information to the magnitude of the earnings reconciliation between IFRS and local 
GAAP.  Specifically, we measure the distance from local GAAP EPS to IFRS EPS 
(Diff_EPS ) as |EPS2004, local GAAP –EPS2004, IFRS restated|/| EPS2004, local GAAP|,  assign a firm to 
LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH portfolios based on the level of Diff_EPS, and then define 
RESTATE_MEDIUM (RESTATE_LARGE) as 1 if a firm belongs to the medium (large) 
restatement portfolio, and 0 alternatively.
20
  
We, therefore, consider the following specification in which all independent 
variables (except RESTATE_MEDIUM and RESTATE_LARGE) are incorporated as 
flow (change) variables: 
∆INF= α + β1RESTATE_MEDIUM + β2RESTATE_LARGE  + β3 ∆C            (5) 
 
where INF is alternatively precision in private or public information, C refers to 
firm-specific control variables in model (1), and all other variables are as defined 
                                                 
20 Note that EPS restatement information is available for 2004 only and that the sample size for this test drops from 
1364 to 749 unique firms because for every firm we require that not only the 2004 EPS restatement information be 
available but also the forecast information properties’ metrics and control variables in at least one year of both the pre- 
and post 2005 period be available.  
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before.
21
  The change operator (∆) for the dependent and independent variables represents 
a change in the average values of the variable in the post (2006 and 2007) period relative 
to the average values of the variable in the pre (2003 and 2004) period.     
In Table 6, we report the results of estimating alternative specifications of 
regression equation (5). The first two columns report results using ∆h as the dependent 
variable and the last two columns use ∆s as the dependent variable. The tenor of our 
results is essentially unaltered irrespective of whether the control variables are included 
or excluded in the empirical specification. Specifically, the coefficients on 
RESTATE_LARGE are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all 
estimations, suggesting that changes in the precision of both public and private 
information in the post period are the largest for firms with largest changes in restatement 
portfolios.  Overall, these results indicate that the information environment of analysts 
improves most for firms where IFRS adoption constitutes the largest EPS change. 
[Insert Table 6] 
4.5 IFRS, Earnings Management and Analysts’ Expectations  
In this section, we consider how a manager’s ability to manage earnings to meet 
or beat analysts’ expectations can affect our inferences.  To the extent mandatory 
adoption of IFRS allows enough discretion to encourage meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks, the actual earnings realization is likely to be dependent on the mean 
forecast, and the mean forecast error is biased toward zero.  To explore this issue further, 
we replicate our analyses in Table 5 for subsamples of firms that are least likely to 
manage earnings.  In our first subsample, we take all firm-years and exclude those for 
                                                 
21 We also tested model (5) using the change in consensus as the dependent variable.  Untabulated results indicated no 
association of the change in consensus with the RESTATE_MEDIUM or RESTATE_LARGE variable.  
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which actual earnings beat the last median forecast by less than or equal to 1 percent (i.e., 
1.00 < [actual EPS/median consensus EPS] ≤  1.01) since small earnings surprises are 
more likely to reflect earning management (Burgstahler and Eames 2006).  In our second 
subsample, we focus on firms with extreme earnings surprises because extreme surprises 
are also less indicative of earnings management to meet or beat consensus forecasts 
(Barron et al. 2002).  In particular, we only include observations where firms have beaten 
the last median consensus EPS estimate by 20 percent or more.   
Table 7 reports the regression results for the two subsamples.  These results are 
consistent with the main analysis reported in Table 5, indicating that our documented 
positive IFRS effects on the precision of public and private information do not result 
from more earnings management practices under IFRS. 
[Insert Table 7] 
4.6 Analyst-specific Private Information Quality   
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our main results to the BKLS 
assumption that the expected precision of idiosyncratic information is the same across 
analysts following a firm.  Gu (2005) argues that this assumption is unlikely to hold 
because analysts’ private information can come either from their private communication 
with managers or from individual analytical skills and efforts, both of which can vary 
across analysts.   
To address this issue, we follow Gu (2005) to derive analyst-specific precision 
using the following formula: 
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where Va is the variance of error in the individual forecast by analyst a. Specifically, we 
calculate the precision of private information averaged at the analyst-year level ( as ) 
and track the evolution over time.   
Because the unit of analysis is a specific analyst (instead of the firm followed by 
the analysts), we control for analyst characteristics related to their resources, skills, and 
experience.  The idea is that analysts with certain characteristics benefit more from the 
mandatory IFRS adoption, which enables them to engage in more private information 
acquisition.  The three analyst-level variables we examine relate to an analyst’s coverage 
of countries (MULTI_CNTRY) and industries (IND_SPECIALIST), as well as broker 
size characteristics (BROKER_SIZE).  MULTI_CNTRY is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the analyst follows firms located in more than one country, and zero otherwise. 
IND_SPECIALIST is a Herfindahl-type sector specialization measure based on the 
number of forecasts (N) an analyst (a) does in the same 2-digit industry (i) in year (y) 
compared to the number of forecasts the analysts provides across different countries (c). 
As in Sonney (2009), we code IND_SPECIALIST equal to one if 
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 BROKER_SIZE is the number of analysts 
employed by the brokerage firm that employs a firm’s analyst.   
We then estimate the following model:  
sa = α0 + β1ADOPT + β2POSTADOPT + βk ∑Ck+ θk ∑Ck * ADOPT +  
λk ∑Ck * POSTADOPT + υa∑Aa εa,t                                        (6) 
                                                 
22
 Results are similar if we code IND_SPECIALIST equal to one if an analyst follows one 2-digit industry 
(SIC) code only.  
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where sa is the standardized rank of the precision of private formation as 
calculated in Gu (2004) and averaged per analyst-year, C is an analyst-specific control 
variable, A is analyst-fixed effects, and all other variables are as defined above.  
Panel A of Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics of precision of private 
information averaged at the analyst-year level and analyst-specific characteristics. The 
median analyst covers 2 countries and 3 industries.  Sixty-two percent of the analysts 
follow firms in more than 1 country and 13 percent of the analysts are industry experts.  
The median number of analysts employed by a brokerage house is 52.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Panel B of Table 8 reports regression results for model (6) using sa as the 
dependent variable. Each estimation adds an additional control variable and its interaction 
with ADOPT and POSTADOPT variable.
23
  Standard errors are clustered at the analyst 
level (Petersen 2009).  The coefficients on the main effects for MULTI_CNTRY are 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that analysts that cover 
more countries exhibit less analyst-specific precision of private information in the pre-
IFRS adoption period.  The main effects for the other control variables (IND_SPEC and 
BROKER_SIZE) and ADOPT are statistically insignificant.  However, the coefficients 
on POSTADOPT are positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, indicating that 
analyst-specific precision of private information increased after the first year of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS.  These results are similar to those reported in Table 5 
(which is based on the firm-level precision measures) but yield some interesting 
additional insights.  When we allow the analyst-specific variables to interact with 
                                                 
23
 Because we introduce analyst-fixed effects in the model, we are unable to include an experience variable 
as an additional control in our models.  
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ADOPT and POSTADOPT variables, we find that the analysts that are following firms in 
more than one country experience a large adoption (0.053; t=3.12) and especially post-
IFRS adoption increase (0.068; t=4.15) in private information precision.  Before IFRS 
adoption, analysts following firms in multiple countries experienced no private 
information advantage compared to other analysts.  However, IFRS reporting seems to 
give these analysts a boost in their private information precision quality.  
These findings are consistent with IFRS promoting comparability across 
countries, and comparability affecting analysts’ private information production 
positively, especially for those analysts following firms across different countries. 
Overall, these results complement the findings in the U.S. setting documented by De 
Franco et al. (2009) on the effects of comparability on analyst following, forecast 
accuracy, and bias.   
4.7 Industry/Country Types and Forecasts Information Properties 
 Using similar research samples, related studies have found modest evidence on 
analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion improvements but stronger evidence when data 
are sliced across financial versus non-financial firms (Horton et al. 2009) and across 
country-level variables (Byard et al., 2010).  We therefore examine two extensions to our 
baseline predictions.  First, we examine whether the precision of the public and private 
information, and analysts’ consensus vary cross-sectionally depending on whether a firm 
belongs to the financial or non-financial industry similar to the approach in Horton et al. 
(2009).  Empirically, we group firms into financial and non-financial firms and examine 
whether the information environment variables changed after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS.  Unreported results show qualitatively similar findings compared to full sample 
results reported in Panel A of Table 5, except that the increase in private information 
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precision in the ADOPT period becomes significant at conventional (5%, one-sided) 
levels for non-financials.  This is consistent with the findings in Horton et al. (2009) who 
show that analyst forecast accuracy improved especially for non-financial firms. 
 Second, we examine whether the change in information environment variables 
varies across countries classified by the strength of the enforcement regime and extent of 
differences between IFRS and domestic accounting standards.  Byard et al. (2010) find 
significant decreases in both forecast errors and dispersion for mandatory adopters 
domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement and domestic accounting standards 
that differ substantially from IFRS.  Therefore, we also focus on the information 
environment variables conditional on countries’ institutional characteristics.  Specifically, 
we use the “Rule of Law” measure for 2005 from Kaufman et al. (2007) to capture the 
strength of legal enforcement. Rule of Law measures can be positive or negative, with 
higher values indicating stronger legal and enforcement regimes.  Moreover, we follow 
Bae et al. (2008) to measure differences between IFRS and local GAAP.  Bae et al (2008) 
focus on 21 key accounting items and rely on a comprehensive survey (Nobes 2001) to 
identify differences in these 21 accounting items between the local GAAP and IFRS.
24
  
GAAP differences have a theoretical range from zero to 21. 
 Untabulated results indicate that the results for the two subsamples of countries 
are qualitatively similar with one notable exception. Specifically, for countries with weak 
enforcement regimes and a large distance in local GAAP to IFRS (i.e., the country cluster 
of Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), the increase in public 
                                                 
24
 Examples of topics of accounting differences across countries relate to recognition and measurement of 
financial instruments, impairment losses, provisions, employee benefit liabilities, capitalization of research 
and development expenses and internally generated intangible assets, disclosure of related party 
transactions, presentation of a statement of changes in equity and a statement of cash flows.   
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information precision becomes insignificant in the ADOPT period (0.004; t=0.29), but is 
statistically significant in the POSTADOPT period (0.082; t=6.17).25  This finding is not 
surprising in that analysts’ learning effects may have taken somewhat longer when IFRS 
substantially differed from local GAAP.  However, the statistically significant 
POSTADOPT coefficient does suggest similar information improvements for all EU 
countries after full-IFRS compliant reporting.   
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we examine whether mandatory IFRS adoptions affected the 
properties of information contained in analyst forecasts.  The period surrounding 
mandatory adoption of IFRS provides a particularly useful setting to examine the effect 
of change in information publicly available to financial analysts.  Whereas prior studies 
have documented improvements in the corporate information environment post-IFRS 
adoption, there is no evidence so far on the information channel that caused these 
improvements.  Using the information precision measures derived from analyst forecasts 
and first developed by Barron et al. (1998), our results indicate that mandatory adoption 
of IFRS triggered the generation of both more precise common (public) and private 
(idiosyncratic) information by financial analysts.     
Despite the observed changes in the precision of public and private information, 
we are unable to detect a change in the consensus among financial analysts after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS.  This absence of a detectable change in the consensus 
among financial analysts suggests that the percentage increase in the precision of 
common information is offset by a proportionate increase in the precision of private 
                                                 
25
 Following Byard et al. (2010), this cluster consists of  sample countries with “Rule of Law” values of less 
than 1.6 (sample median) and IFRS local GAAP difference greater than or equal to 11 (sample median).  
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information such that consensus among analysts does not change.  At the analyst-specific 
level, we find that the analysts who followed firms in more than one country experience 
the largest post-IFRS improvement in private information precision.  
Overall, our results suggest that mandatory adoption of IFRS had a significant 
effect on the information processing of financial analysts, but that analysts do require 
some adjustment period in which they learn to deal with the new disclosures and 
measurement rules. This is especially the case when there are large differences between 
local GAAP and IFRS rules and for financial firms that are governed by complicated and 
sometimes still evolving IFRS rules (e.g., on financial instruments). Moreover, we show 
that the precision improvement did not occur homogeneously across analysts.  In 
particular, we find evidence consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe 
promoting comparability, which in turn positively affected private information 
production of those analysts following firms across multiple countries.  Our results are 
consistent with the argument in De Franco et al. (2009) that increased comparability 
lowers the costs of acquiring information from sources other than management, thereby 
affecting analyst forecast accuracy and bias.  Our results also suggest that analysts 
invested differently in private information discovery in response to the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection Process 
Panel A: EU Sample 
Sample Criteria 
# 
Individual 
Forecasts 
#  
Analyst  
Years 
#  
Firm  
Years 
 #  
Unique 
Analysts 
#  
Unique 
Firms 
       
EU17, 12/31 fiscal year-end firms with non-stale one-year  
ahead EPS forecasts in I/B/E/S for the 2003-07 period 84,151 11,775 7,347 
  
4,757 2,368 
       
Minus firms with less than 2 analyst forecasts  
per estimation period (FPE1): -1,820 -252 -1,795 
 
-109 -608 
       
=  82,331 11,523 5,552  4,648 1,760 
       
Minus: early adopters or those required to adopt only after 
2007  -14,867 -643 -708 
 
-169 -173 
       
= Sample of Mandatory IFRS adopters: 67,464 10,880 4,844  4,479 1,587 
       
Minus: firms with insufficient data available 
 to conduct multivariate analyses: -1,588 -1,074 -314 
 
-396 -223 
  
 
 
 
 
 
= Final Sample 65,876 9,856 4,530  4,083 1,364 
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Panel B: US (Control) Sample 
Sample Criteria 
# 
Individual 
Forecasts 
#  
Analyst 
Years 
#  
Firm  
Years 
 #  
Unique 
Analysts 
#  
Unique  
Firms 
       
US, 12/31 fiscal year-end firms with 1 or more FPE1  
EPS forecasts in IBES for the 2003-07 period 194,643 18,502 14,742 
 
6,743 4,305 
       
Minus firms with less than 2 analyst forecasts per 
estimation period (FPE1): -61,404 -6,538 -4,523 
 
-2,205 -1,050 
       
= 133,239 11,964 10,219  4,538 3,255 
       
Minus: firms with insufficient data available  to conduct 
multivariate analyses: -3,012 -254 243 
 
-123 -97 
       
= Final sample 130,227 11,710 9,776  4,415 3,158 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Barron et al. (1998) Measures by Period 
 
 
Variable period N Median Q1 Q3 Std 
h  
1 1,779 4.875 1.002 17.583 354.56 
2 947 6.607 1.213 22.271 162.30 
3 1,804 11.938 2.319 47.557 418.17 
       
s 
1 1,779 2.093 0.191 16.823 816.25 
2 947 2.885 0.197 22.651 338.81 
3 1,804 5.768 0.375 51.397 736.90 
       
ρ 1 1,779 0.736 0.341 0.934 0.34 
 2 947 0.751 0.314 0.942 0.35 
 3 1,804 0.720 0.283 0.939 0.35 
       
D 1 1,779 0.016 0.004 0.072 42.16 
 2 948 0.009 0.003 0.036 2.78 
 3 1,804 0.005 0.001 0.025 4.37 
       
SE 1 1,779 0.053 0.009 0.307 118.03 
 2 948 0.039 0.007 0.189 6.78 
 3 1,804 0.021 0.003 0.123 6.92 
       
Period 1 refers to 2003 and 2004 when IFRS adoption was not mandatory. Period 2 refers to 2005 when 
IFRS adoption became mandatory. Period 3 covers years after the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption 
(2006 and 2007).  All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables Used in Multivariate Tests 
  
Panel A:EU sample 
 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std 
       
MV  4,530 5,020 324 970 3,587 11,995 
MTB 4,530 3.29 1.51 2.23 3.43 15.30 
RD 4,530 60.99 0.00 0.00 9.80 330.30 
NUMANAL 4,530 7.22 3.00 5.00 10.00 5.70 
AVG_PREDLAG  4,530 33.05 19.50 30.00 45.00 18.20 
PROP_LATE 4,530 0.531 0.429 0.548 0.667 0.182 
 
 
Panel B: US 
Benchmark Sample 
 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median P75 Std 
MV 9,776 6,743 395 1,105 3,713 22,261 
MTB 9,776 3.49 1.51 2.19 3.41 53.45 
RD 9,776 99.13 0.00 0.00 21.18 541.00 
NUMANAL 9,776 6.53 3.00 5.00 8.00 5.04 
AVG_PREDLAG 9,776 23.90 10.67 20.91 34.00 17.61 
PROP_LATE 9,776 0.408 0.286 0.412 0.556 0.196 
 
All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 4: Correlations (EU sample) 
 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
[1] h 1.000 0.539 0.102 -0.769 -0.567 0.113 0.168 -0.059 0.045 -0.018 0.102 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 
[2] s  1.000 -0.727 -0.278 -0.922 0.151 0.157 -0.018 0.162 -0.012 0.090 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.40 0.00 
[3] ρ   1.000 -0.345 0.601 -0.118 -0.060 -0.038 -0.180 -0.005 -0.025 
    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.72 0.09 
[4] D    1.000 0.457 -0.031 -0.149 0.096 0.098 0.023 -0.109 
     0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 
[5] SE     1.000 -0.135 -0.181 0.040 -0.108 0.008 -0.106 
      0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.57 0.00 
[6] MV      1.000 0.111 0.311 0.591 -0.212 -0.005 
       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 
[7] MTB       1.000 0.078 0.059 -0.018 0.039 
        0.00 0.00 0.22 0.01 
[8] RD        1.000 0.303 -0.154 -0.126 
         0.00 0.00 0.00 
[9] NUMANAL         1.000 -0.270 -0.317 
          0.00 0.00 
[10] AVG_PREDLAG          1.000 0.159 
           0.00 
[11] PROP_LATE           1.000 
 
Note: The table reports Pearson correlations between the variables of interest (standardized and ranked values). P-values are reported below the correlation 
values. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  
Table 5: Regression Results   
 
Panel A: EU sample                    
Dependent Variable: 
Precision of 
Common Info. (h) 
Precision of 
Idiosyncratic 
Info. (s) 
Consensus (ρ) D SE  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
                
Constant 0.297 4.73 ‡ 0.128 2.58 ‡ 0.784 13.01 ‡ 0.514 10.84 ‡ 0.650 14.78 ‡ 
ADOPT 0.022 2.40 † 0.015 1.46  0.009 0.81  -0.040 -4.48 ‡ -0.026 -2.50 † 
POSTADOPT 0.105 11.05 ‡ 0.085 8.84 ‡ 0.006 0.61  -0.153 -15.87 ‡ -0.106 -11.16 ‡ 
MV 0.049 1.69 * 0.095 3.11 ‡ -0.033 -1.22  -0.083 -2.63 ‡ -0.095 -3.09 ‡ 
MTB 0.179 9.99 ‡ 0.171 9.05 ‡ -0.033 -1.93 * -0.235 -11.92 ‡ -0.203 -10.62 ‡ 
RD -0.178 -3.59 ‡ -0.162 -3.14 ‡ -0.020 -0.45  0.236 4.11 ‡ 0.179 3.34 ‡ 
NUMANAL 0.089 3.07 ‡ 0.126 4.07 ‡ -0.187 -6.57 ‡ 0.151 4.73 ‡ -0.068 -2.19 † 
AVG_PREDLAG -0.033 -2.19 † -0.007 -0.47  -0.043 -2.73 ‡ 0.074 4.85 ‡ 0.016 1.11  
PROP_LATE 0.060 3.55 ‡ 0.090 4.88 ‡ -0.050 -2.77 ‡ -0.057 -3.18 ‡ -0.092 -5.03 ‡ 
                
Industry (1-digit)-fixed 
effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
Country-fixed 
effects  Yes   Yes.   Yes   Yes   Yes. 
 
                
N 4,530   4,530   4,530   4,530   4,530   
# of firms 1,364   1,364   1,364   1,364   1,364   
Adj-R
2
 0.119   0.138   0.064   0.194   0.150   
 
‡, †, * : significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Note that both the dependent and independent variables are standardized rank (0,1) variables as in BKLS (2002). All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
Standard errors are White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009). 
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Table 5: Regression Results (Continued) 
Panel B: US (Benchmark) Sample 
 
Dependent variable: 
(1)Precision of 
Common Info (h) 
(2) Precision of 
Idiosync. Info. (s) 
(3) Consensus (ρ) (4) D (5) SE  
                
Constant 0.395 13.82 ‡ 0.188 7.59 ‡ 0.824 34.81 ‡ 0.524 17.23 ‡ 0.807 30.43 ‡ 
ADOPT -0.019 -3.05 ‡ -0.011 -1.58  0.002 0.27  0.011 1.79 * 0.009 1.38  
POSTADOPT -0.040 -6.68 ‡ -0.005 -0.76  -0.023 -3.36 ‡ 0.045 7.51 ‡ 0.015 2.38 ‡ 
MV 0.337 19.39 ‡ 0.228 14.82 ‡ 0.003 0.20  -0.332 -18.30 ‡ -0.284 -17.45 ‡ 
MTB 0.123 9.48 ‡ 0.095 7.98 ‡ -0.023 -1.93 * -0.103 -7.60 ‡ -0.111 -8.80 ‡ 
RD -0.164 -3.72 ‡ -0.026 -0.70  -0.123 -3.50 ‡ 0.222 4.72 ‡ 0.058 1.43  
NUMANAL -0.033 -1.75 * 0.064 3.85 ‡ -0.116 -7.14 ‡ 0.145 7.38 ‡ 0.009 0.49  
AVG_PREDLAG 0.016 1.61 * 0.063 5.94 ‡ -0.074 -6.75 ‡ 0.033 3.20 ‡ -0.043 -4.19 ‡ 
PROP_LATE 0.028 2.46 † 0.070 6.22 ‡ -0.060 -5.26 ‡ -0.022 -1.84 * -0.070 -6.01 ‡ 
                
Industry (1-digit) Fixed 
Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
                
N 9,776   9,776   9,776   9,776   9,776   
# of firms 3,097   3,097   3,097   3,097   3,097   
Adj-R
2
 0.187   0.111   0.034   0.184   0.142   
 
‡, †, * : significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Note that both the dependent and independent variables are standardized rank (0,1) variables as in BKLS (2002). All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
Standard errors are White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009).
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Table 6: Regression Results of the Changes in the Precision of Public and Private Information for Subsamples Classified by 
the Magnitude of EPS Restatement Difference Reported At First-time IFRS Adoption 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆ in precision of common information (h)     ∆ in precision of private information (s) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 
Parameter 
Estimate        t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate        t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate        t-stat   
Parameter 
Estimate 
         
      t-stat  
         
Constant 0.472 24.30‡  0.295 5.96‡  0.479 24.20‡  0.417 8.03‡ 
RESTATE_MEDIUM 0.007 0.27  0.004 0.14  0.005 0.18  0.001 0.03 
RESTATE_LARGE 0.069 2.65‡  0.068 2.66‡  0.063 2.42‡  0.065 2.51‡ 
∆(MV)     0.142 3.97‡      0.162 4.34‡ 
∆(MTB)     0.077 1.98*      0.004 0.10 
∆(R&D)     -0.004 -0.10      0.045 1.23 
∆(NUMANAL)     0.061 1.48      -0.101 -2.48† 
∆(AVG_PREDLAG)     -0.020 -0.54      -0.010 -0.26 
∆(PROP_LATE)     0.099 2.30†      0.020 0.47 
                
N 749   749   749   749  
Adj-R2 0.011   0.053   0.021   0.050  
  
‡, †, * : significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Firms in the SMALL, MEDIUM, and LARGE restatements portfolio reflect the bottom third, middle third, and top third, respectively, of the restatement 
measured as the absolute value of 2004 local GAAP earnings per share (EPS) minus the reconciled 2004 IFRS EPS, scaled by local EPS (i.e., |(EPSLOCAL04 - 
EPSIFRS04)/ EPSLOCAL04|. RESTATE_MEDIUM is 1 if a firm belongs to the MEDIUM restatement portfolio, 0 otherwise. RESTATE_LARGE is 1 if a firm 
belongs to the LARGE restatement portfolio, 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Appendix 1 and the change operator (∆) for the dependent and 
independent variables represents a change in the variable in the ADOPT (i.e., 2005) period relative to the average values of the variable in the pre (2003 and 
2004) period. Standard errors are White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009). 
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Table 7: Regression Results for Subsamples with Low Earnings Management Probability around IFRS Adoption 
 
 
Sample excluding Firms with Small Positive 
Earnings Surprise 
Sample of Firms with Extreme Positive  Earnings 
Surprise Only 
Dependent Variables Precision of   Precision of  Precision of  Precision of  
 Common info. (h)  Idiosyncratic Info. (s) Common Info. (h)  Idiosyncratic Info. (s) 
 
Parameter  
Estimate t-stat   
Parameter  
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter  
Estimate t-stat   
Parameter  
Estimate t-stat  
               
Constant 0.314 6.54 ‡  0.258 5.98 ‡ 0.078 1.06   -0.164 -2.16 † 
ADOPT 0.019 2.05 †  0.007 0.73  0.034 1.73 *  0.019 0.89  
POSTADOPT 0.127 12.83 ‡  0.076 7.66 ‡ 0.102 5.01 ‡  0.092 4.50 ‡ 
MV 0.169 4.85 ‡  0.199 5.89 ‡ 0.154 2.53 ‡  0.061 1.04  
MTB 0.215 10.95 ‡  0.158 8.50 ‡ 0.105 2.82 ‡  -0.045 -1.31  
RD -0.227 -4.00 ‡  -0.153 -2.94 ‡ -0.265 -2.92 ‡  -0.036 -0.41  
NUM_ANAL -0.030 -0.88   0.046 1.39  0.016 0.28   0.170 2.98 ‡ 
AVG_PREDLAG -0.032 -2.03 †  -0.001 -0.04  -0.002 -0.07   0.017 0.54  
PROP_LATE 0.057 3.14 ‡  0.049 2.58 ‡ 0.099 2.73 ‡  0.090 2.52 ‡ 
               
Industry fixed effects Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes   
Country fixed effects Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes   
               
N 4,350    4,350   815    815   
# Of Firms 1,352    1,352   501    501   
Adj-R
2
 0.184    0.266   0.226    0.234   
 
‡, †, * : significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
The first subsample excludes firm-years for which actual earnings beat the last median forecast by less than or equal to 1 percent (i.e., 1.00 < [actual EPS/median 
consensus EPS] ≤  1.01).  Sample of extreme positive earnings surprise includes firms that have beaten the last median consensus EPS estimate by 20 percent or 
more.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009).    
 
 
 
 
48   
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results (Analyst-level Analysis)  
 
 Panel A: Analyst Characteristics 
 
Variable 
N Mean Median 
  
P5 Q1 Q3 P95 Std 
 
9,856 26.52 5.72  0.00 1.65 16.39 97.97 134.50 
NR_COUNTRIES 9,856 2.52 2.00  1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 1.69 
MULTI_CNTRY 9,856 0.62 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 
NR_INDUSTRIES 9,856 4.01 3.00  1.00 2.00 5.00 9.00 2.87 
IND_SPEC 9,856 0.13 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 
BROKER_SIZE 9,856 77.55 52.00  8.00 20.00 114.00 228.00 74.83 
          
as
 
 
 
 
49   
Panel B: Regression Results  
     
Dependent Variable: 
STRANK(sa)       
 
Parameter 
estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
estimate t-stat  
Constant 0.491 25.39 ‡ 0.491 22.26 ‡ 0.495 21.97 ‡ 
ADOPT 0.012 0.86  0.012 0.79  0.008 0.41  
POSTADOPT 0.049 3.77 ‡ 0.049 3.35 ‡ 0.036 1.84 * 
          
MULTI_CNTRY -0.035 -2.28 † -0.036 -2.00 * -0.034 -1.90 * 
MULTI_CNTRY xADOPT 0.053 3.12 ‡ 0.053 2.72 ‡ 0.052 2.59 ‡ 
MULTI_CNTRY xPOST 0.068 4.15 ‡ 0.070 3.66 ‡ 0.065 3.27 ‡ 
          
IND_SPEC 0.011 0.64  0.015 0.63  0.018 0.72  
IND_SPECxADOPT    0.003 0.10  0.002 0.07  
IND_SPECxPOST    -0.012 -0.45  -0.016 -0.58  
          
BROKER_SIZE -0.027 -0.81  -0.027 -0.72  -0.037 -0.93  
BROKER_SIZExADOPT       0.009 0.28  
BROKER_SIZExPOST       0.033 0.97  
          
Analyst Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
          
N.  9,856   9,856   9,856   
# of Analysts 4,083   4,083   4,083   
Adj-R
2
 0.201   0.201   0.201   
 
‡, †, * : significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 For regression analysis, the dependent variable sa and the variable BROKER_SIZE are ranked and standardized between 0 and 1 because raw values of are highly 
skewed. ). Standard errors are White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the analyst-level (Petersen 2009).  All variables are defined in the 
Appendix 1.
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable     Definition      
 
Dependent Variables: 
Precision of common info (h)     
2
1
1 





+





−
−
SED
N
N
D
SE
        
     
Precision of private information (s)  
2
1
1 





+





− SED
N
D
             
Consensus (ρ)     
SED
N
N
D
SE
+





−
−
1
1
 
where D  Dispersion among the forecasts of a firm and is equal to 
( ) ,FF
1N
1
2N
1i
i∑
=
−
−
 
SE   Squared error in the mean forecast of a firm and is equal to ( ) ,2FA −  
Fa   Forecast by analyst a,  
 
F   Mean forecast,  
 
A  Actual earnings realization,  
 
N  Number of analysts issuing forecasts 
 
as  Average square root of the analyst-specific private information 
component (sa), calculated as in Gu (2005). 
 
Test and Control Variables 
 
ADOPT              Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation is from 2005 fiscal-year 
(mandatory IFRS adoption year) and 0 otherwise. 
 
POSTADOPT               Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation is from 2006 or later 
fiscal year (post-mandatory IFRS adoption year) and 0 otherwise 
 
MV  Fiscal year-end market value of equity (in millions Euros) [Source: 
Datastream] 
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MTB  Fiscal-year-end market-to-book ratio [Source: Datastream] 
 
RD  Average R&D expenses per firm in the post-IFRS [2006 and 2007] 
period [Source: Datastream] 
 
 NUMANAL   Total number of unique analysts that issue at least one forecast during the 
3-month period following prior year’s earnings announcement [Source: 
Datastream] 
 
AVG_PREDLAG   Average number of days between previous year’s earnings 
announcement and an analyst’s initial EPS forecast that was initiated 
within 3 months after prior year’s earnings announcement [Source: 
I/B/E/S] 
 
PROP_LATE           Proportion of 1-year ahead EPS forecasts that are initiated after the 3 
month period after prior year’s earnings announcement, expressed as a 
fraction of all one-year ahead forecasts during the calendar year  [Source: 
I/B/E/S] 
 
Analyst-Specific Variables 
 
NR_COUNTRIES   Number of different countries that a specific analysts covers 
 
MULTI_CNTRY   Dummy variable equal to one if the analyst follows firms located in more 
than one country, zero otherwise. 
 
BROKER_SIZE  Number of analysts employed by the brokerage house 
 
NR_INDUSTRIES  Number of 2-digit SIC codes that a specific analysts covers 
 
IND_SPEC   Herfindahl-based sector specialization measure based on the number of 
forecasts (N) an analyst (a) does for the same 2-digit industry (i) in year 
(y) compared to the number of forecasts the analysts provides across 
different countries (c). IND_SPEC is coded equal to one (1) if 
2
1 ,
,,
∑
=





I
i yNa
yaNi
> 0.9 and 
2
1 ,
,,
∑
=





C
c yNa
yaNc
< 0.90; 0 otherwise 
 
  
